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THE OPTIMIST'S  TALE
THE  BURGER  COURT:  THE  COUNTER-REVOLUTION  THAT  WASN'T.
Edited by Vincent Blasi. New Haven:  Yale University  Press  1983.
Pp. xiv,  326.
MARK  TUSHNETt
An optimist is a person who,  after being pushed out of a thirtieth-
story window,  replies to  a questioner  on the  fifteenth floor,  "All  right
so  far!"  The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution That Wasn't," a
collection  of eleven  essays  on  the Burger  Court's decisions,  is  an opti-
mist's book.  Its  thesis is  clear from the subtitle:  liberals  feared that the
Burger  Court would  gut the advances  in civil liberties made during the
Warren era, but it has not. Defending this thesis requires that one both
identify the  advances  in civil  liberties  made  by the Warren  Court and
determine  to what  extent,  if  any,  the  Burger  Court  has  undermined
them. If one  agrees,  as  I do  on balance,  that no counterrevolution  has
occurred,  two additional  questions need answers. Why didn't the coun-
terrevolution  occur,  given  what  we think  we know  about the  political
predelictions  of the Nixon and  Reagan  appointees?  And if no counter-
revolution  occurred,  what  did  happen?  This  Review  takes  up  those
questions. 2
I.  THE  WARREN  COURT  AND  THE  BURGER  COURT
Each  of the  contributors  to  The Burger Court writes  against  a
usually  implicit  background  of admiration  for the accomplishments  of
the Warren Court. The "no  counterrevolution"  thesis  can be sustained
either  by diminishing the grandeur  of those  accomplishments  or  by ex-
alting  the  accomplishments  of  the  Burger  Court.  Ruth  Bader  Gins-
" Professor of Law, Georgetown  University. B.A.  1967, Harvard University; J.D.
1971,  M.A.  1971,  Yale  University.
1  (V.  Blasi ed.  1983)  [hereinafter  cited as THE  BURGER  COURT].
THE  BURGER  COURT  is  sponsored  by  the  Society  of American  Law  Teachers
(SALT),  which  will  receive  a portion of the  royalties.  For the  past  two years I  have
been  a  member  of the  board  of directors  of SALT.  The  project  was  essentially  com-
pleted  before  I became  a member of the board.
'  Because of my competence,  I will discuss in this Review only those essays deal-
ing  with  constitutional  law.  I  suspect-and  regret-that  other  reviewers  are just  as
likely to slight the essays by Theodore St. Antoine on labor law and Richard Markovits
on antitrust law.  But I certainly  can't say anything about them that anyone ought to be
interested  in  reading.
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burg's  essay  on  sex  discrimination3  takes  the  latter  course.  Consisting
largely of a  summary  of the Burger  Court's  decisions,  the  essay  prop-
erly  characterizes  the Court's  performance  as "striking"4  and "spectac-
ular."5  Because  "[e]vening  up the rights, responsibilities,  and  opportu-
nities  of  men  and  women  was  not  on  the  agenda  of  the  Warren
Court,"'  anything the Burger Court did would improve  on the Warren
Court's performance.  That remains true even  though the Burger Court
has not done  all that supporters  of equal rights desired. Without depre-
cating  the accomplishment,  though, I want to mention something that I
discuss in more detail later:  the Burger Court's  decisions in gender dis-
crimination  cases  are  shot  through  with  class  concerns.1  Perhaps be-
cause  of how  the essays  divide  up the terrain,  class  issues  never  fully
emerge  from  the background.
The other strategy  for sustaining the book's thesis  is pursued  most
clearly by Yale  Kamisar in an essay on criminal  procedure.'  He begins
by describing what  the  Warren  Court did.  It approved  the use  of the
intrusive  investigative  techniques  often  thought  necessary  in  cases  of
corruption  and  large-scale  trafficking  in drugs:  undercover  agents  and
electronic  surveillance.'  It  sought to  impose the  rules  professionals  in
the  field  had  been  using  without  difficulty-warnings  and  controlled
use  of  investigative  stops-on  all  police  departments." l  Although
Kamisar does not say so, what the Warren  Court did was to attempt to
remold all police forces  on the model of the most thoroughly  profession-
alized.  If  police  departments  actually  conformed  to  the  professional
model,  their own  adherence to  professional  norms, more  than external
controls  imposed  by  the  courts,  would  guarantee  the  liberty  of  the
citizenry.
Kamisar  identifies  "two  Burger  Courts."' 11  The  first  appeared  in
the  immediate  aftermath  of  the Rehnquist  and  Powell  appointments.
That  Burger  Court  seemed  to  be  bent  on  "gutt[ing]" 12  many  of the
Warren  Court's decisions.  Here too Kamisar ventures  no explanations,
'  Ginsburg,  The Burger Court's Grapplings with  Sex  Discrimination, in  THE
BURGER COURT,  supra note  1,  at  132.
*  Id. at  132.
* Id. at  151.
6Id. at  132.
See  infra text  accompanying  notes  112-15.
8  Kamisar,  The Warren Court (Was It  Really So Defense-Minded?), The Burger
Court (Is It  Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices, in
THE  BURGER COURT,  supra note  1,  at 62.
9  Id. at  63-64.
10  Id. at  64-67.
21  Id. at  68.
12  Id.
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but it seems  likely that this first Burger  Court felt it essential to  estab-
lish a different  tone from its predecessor, to signal that the forces of law
and order had (re)gained control of the Court. Then, that signal clearly
sent, the second Burger  Court proceeded  to consolidate and even  extend
the  most  enduring  contributions  of the Warren  Court.  It has demon-
strated a "strong  commitment  to the warrant clause""3  by insisting that
a valid  warrant to  search  a  bar and  the bartender  did not  authorize  a
search  of the bar's customers14 and  by holding that the police  could not
routinely  enter  a home  to make  an  arrest  without  a warrant.' 5 It has
developed  a  definition  of "interrogation"  that is sensitive  to the values
served by the Miranda  warnings 6 and has disinterred the doctrine lim-
iting interrogations  after  adversary  proceedings  have  been  initiated.
17
Kamisar  rejects  the  claim that the decisions  of the second  Burger
Court look tolerable  only because  they have not fulfilled the worst fears
engendered  by  the decisions  of the first Burger  Court. 8  I am inclined
to  agree,  but  do  have  some  questions  about  Kamisar's  analysis.  First,
the  second  Burger  Court  appears  to  have  come  into  its  own  around
1979.  With  Justice  O'Connor  replacing  Justice  Stewart,  who  had  a
perverse  attraction  to  the  warrant  clause,'9  we  may  find  yet  a  third
Burger  Court  in  the making,  one  that resembles  the  first.  Second,  in
describing  the  Burger  Court's  first  amendment  decisions,  Thomas
Emerson  concludes that it "has  lost that feeling for the dynamics of the
system  . . . which  was  the hallmark  of the  Warren  Court.""0  Some-
thing similar  may  characterize  the  criminal  procedure  decisions.  The
Warren  Court had  a vision  of policing  as an integrated  system all  ele-
ments  of which  could  be  professionalized.2'  The  signals  the  Warren
Court  sent  to  police  officers  and  administrators  about its  expectations
may have  been  even  more significant  than its doctrinal  innovations.  In
this  light the  counterrevolution  may  have  been  completed  by  the  first
Burger Court. It told police  administrators  and  officers  that they  could
13  Id. at  79.
'4  Ybarra  v.  Illinois, 444 U.S.  85  (1979).
15  Payton  v.  New  York,  445  U.S.  573  (1980).
16  Kamisar, supra note  8,  at  87-89.
17  Id.  at  90.
18  See id. at 81.
"I See,  e.g.,  Robbins  v.  California,  453  U.S.  420  (1981),  overruled by  United
States  v.  Ross,  456  U.S.  798  (1982);  Coolidge  v.  New  Hampshire,  403  U.S.  443
(1971).
20  Emerson,  Freedom of the Press Under the Burger Court, in  THE  BURGER
COURT,  supra note  1, at 26.
21  This vision  is expressed  in  passages  like that in Terry v.  Ohio,  392 U.S.  1, 13
(1968),  noting  the  limitations  on the  exclusionary  rule  "as  a  tool  of judicial  control,"
and  in  Lewis  v. United  States,  385  U.S.  206,  208  (1966),  discussing  the  need for un-
dercover  agents  to investigate  certain  types of crimes.
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loosen up. The  second Burger  Court, on this interpretation,  simply  is-
sues occasional  reminders  that loosening  up does  not mean abandoning
all controls.  The system of policing would  be measurably  less protective
of the  citizenry  under  these  circumstances,  again  no  matter  what  the
particular  holdings  were.  My  guess  is that  changes  in  policing  essen-
tially  unrelated  to  judicial  doctrine  have  imposed  the  kinds  of  con-
straints  on  police  forces  that  the  Warren  Court  sought.  These  con-
straints are not, of course,  uniform throughout the country nor are they
sufficient  as  yet,  but police  forces  have  become  more  professionalized,
and the increasing racial  integration of urban  police  forces has  reduced
the kind of harassment  to which judicial doctrine rarely speaks.22 If my
guess is  correct, the counterrevolution,  if any  there was,  came  too late.
II.  WHY  THE  COUNTERREVOLUTION  DID  NOT  HAPPEN
Certainly it is true that the Burger Court has not (yet) fulfilled the
worst fears of those who admire the Warren Court. Yet we know from
what  they  say  in  their  separate  opinions  that, as individuals,  three  to
five members  of the  Court  have quite  conservative  political  views  that
sometimes  affect  their judicial  performance.  The Warren  Court's  ad-
mirers thought that in every case  one or two others  would  be moved to
join the  conservatives,  producing  a uniformly  conservative  body of law.
Why  didn't that happen?
Anthony  Lewis's  foreword  offers  the  conventional  view  that we
have  come to expect of him. Sure, he says, the judges  are political con-
servatives. But conservatives  "are naturally  committed to the doctrine of
stare decisis . . . [and  it]  follows  logically  that they  should  respect  a
precedent  once established,  even though they  opposed that result during
the process  of decision.""8  Although  I have my  doubts,  perhaps  this is
so for  "true  [conservatives  such]  as Justice John  Marshall  Harlan."' 24
But, apart  from the lack of a counterrevolution,  there really is not a lot
of evidence that Chief Justice Burger  or Justice  Rehnquist  is a "true"
conservative.  They  are  reactionaries,  pure  and  simple,  and,  as  I  will
argue,  they have indeed  conducted a counterrevolution  of sorts by infus-
ing  the  forms  of adjudication  developed  by the  Warren  Court  with  a
new  content.25
Martin  Shapiro's. brilliant  essay"  comes  closer  to  the  mark.  He
22  But see  City  of  Los  Angeles  v.  Lyons,  103  S.  Ct.  1660  (1983)  (damaging
chokehold  applied without  provocation  or justification).
23  Lewis, Foreword, in THE  BURGER  COURT, supra note  1, at vii,  viii.
24  Id.
25  See infra text accompanying  notes 64-115.
2  Shapiro, Fathers and Sons: The Court, the Commentators, and the Search for
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argues that the Warren  Court succeeded  because  its decisions constitu-
tionalized the  political  bargains  struck  by the New  Deal  coalition  and
thus  drew  into the  Court's  fold  the constituencies  of the New  Deal. 7
The Warren  Court  "was  working out to its  final  conclusions  a set  of
values  and  policy preferences  that had  achieved  an overwhelming  con-
sensus produced by one of the few great crises  and value reorderings  in
American  political  history."' 28  Viewing  the  Court  as  an  actor  in  the
political  universe, Shapiro suggests that the Court is unlikely to depart
very far, or for very  long, from the views  that hold  sway in the rest of
the political  system. Thus,  as the New  Deal  consensus  broke  down, 2
the Court,  no less than Congress and the presidency,  quite literally lost
its  center.  But a judicial  counterrevolution  was  impossible  because  no
political  counterrevolution  had  occurred.
I would push  Shapiro's argument  a little further than he does. As
a political  scientist,  Shapiro emphasizes  that the Court's  actions  build
constituencies of support and opposition. 0  "In a world in which politi-
cal goals are not clear and policy consensus  is diminished, the Supreme
Court  is  as  unlikely  as  the  rest  of government  to  acquire  a cheering
section." 1  But,  cheering  section  or no,  the  Court  is  well  advised  to
avoid creating a constituency whose interests it never advances.  If under
present  circumstances  the Court cannot rely for support on the constit-
uencies satisfied  by an existing consensus, it can build its own coalition.
It does  so by what Vincent  Blasi calls its "rootless  activism."32  Liberals
swallow  hard and  live  with Buckley  v.  Valeo3  because  they  are given
Washington v. Seattle School District  No. P'  in return and decide that
on balance it's worth it all. 8 5 Conservatives,  who in general  do not have
to  swallow  quite  so hard, live with Mills v. Hableutze 8  because  they
are  given  Allied Structural Steel  Co.  v.  Spannaus 3 7 and  Buckley  v.
Valeo in return and decide that on balance it's worth it all. (The differ-
ence  in the  significance  of the cases  suggests  why the conservatives  do
not  have to  swallow so hard and  why the liberals' judgment about the
Values, in THE BURGER  COURT, supra note  1, at  218.
27  Id. at 219.
28  Id. at  237-38.
29  Id. at 237.
30  Id. at  219.
31  Id. at 237.
32  Blasi,  The Rootless Activism  of the Burger Court, in  THE  BURGER  COURT,
supra note  1, at  198.
33  424 U.S.  1 (1976).
- 458  U.S.  457  (1982).
35  I question  this judgment  in Tushnet, An  Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L.  REV.  _
(forthcoming  May  1984).
36  456  U.S.  91  (1982).
37  438  U.S.  234  (1978).
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net benefits might be wrong.)  As a result,  no one is really cheering  for
the  Court, but it maintains a  solid  political  base.
Although  Shapiro  does  not  make  the  argument  in  this  way,  his
analysis  suggests  that  "rootless  activism"  is  a  political  strategy  well
adapted  to  preserving  the  Court's  prerogatives  in  an  era  when  any
"rooted"  activism-revolutionary  or counterrevolutionary-would  gen-
erate  intense  opposition.  Indeed,  the  argument  can  be  extended  a  bit
more,  as  my  earlier  parenthetical  comment  hinted.  A  really  clever
counterrevolutionary,  faced  with  the  political  situation  Shapiro  de-
scribes,  would  conduct  what Antonio  Gramsci called  a war of position.
Conceding  small gains to the opposition  in areas not of central concern,
the  counterrevolutionary  would  attempt  to  secure  somewhat  larger
gains  in areas  closer  to the center  and would  conduct  lighting  raids to
capture really important targets. 8  Mills v. Hableutzel, Loretto v.  Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV  Corp.,9  and Buckley  v.  Valeo exemplify
each of the three categories.  I will argue in the next section that, in the
end, the Burger Court's activism is rooted  in exactly  that way. There is
a counterrevolution  under way, but the tactics are not what the liberals
expected.
There is,  however,  another  reason  for the failure  of open counter-
revolution.  Vincent  Blasi  offers  a  capsule  description  of  the  present
Court.4  He finds the center "intelligent,  open-minded,  and dedicated,"
and  writes  that  "[a]n  advocate  faced  with  the  challenge  of  changing
judicial  minds  with  sound  arguments  would  do  better  to  attempt  the
task in front  of [Justices  White,  Blackmun,  Powell,  and  Stevens]  than
almost any  other  [group  of Justices]  that has in the past held the bal-
ance of power  on the Court.""'  Perhaps  so,  but notice that the task is
one  of changing minds  by  argument  rather than  supplying  arguments
to  support predispositions.  Tony Amsterdam  must  do  the former;  Rex
Lee  need  only  do  the  latter.  I  take  it  to  be  clear  which  position  an
advocate  would  prefer  to  be in.  If the center  is strong,  Blasi  says,  the
extremes  are  weak. Justice  Brennan  is  "pragmatic  . . . , more  clever
than profound." ' 42  Justice Rehnquist is "more  a debater  than a thinker,
more a lawyer than a statesman. 4 3 Blasi says that Brennan and Rehn-
quist  "could  serve  much  better  as  coalition  builders  operating  at  the
S" That this analysis makes  William  Rehnquist  sound like  Ho  Chi Minh  is not
the  only reason  I find  it attractive.
89  458  U.S.  419  (1982).
40  Blasi, supra note  32.
41  Id. at 210-11.
41  Id. at 211.  I have  to say that I do  not really grasp the grounds for  the depreca-
tory tone  of the contrast.  It strikes  me as  more  clever  than  profound.
4'  Id.; see also supra note  42.THE  OPTIMIST'S TALE
center  of  the  Court's  divisions,"  a  role  that  Brennan  played  for  the
Warren  Court  and that Rehnquist  could  play in  the future.4'
What  is  striking about  this  is not  the perfectly  accurate  observa-
tion  that Brennan was a coalition  builder,"5  nor the depressing  sugges-
tion  that Rehnquist  could  become one,4'  but the  failure  to  notice that
Brennan  continues  to  be  a  coalition  builder.  I  suspect  that  when  the
history of the Supreme Court in the 1970's is written, it will reveal that
Brennan's  skills  contributed  as  much  as  anything  to  the absence  of a
counterrevolution.  For example,  one  can  infer  from Justice  Brennan's
opinions  in criminal  procedure  cases that he  simply makes  no effort  to
build  a five-person majority  in most such  cases  and that he  hoards  his
resources  to deploy them in the cases, criminal  procedure  or otherwise,
that he  regards  as  truly important."
But  one  need  not rely  on  an  extended  chain  of inference  from  a
pattern of decisions.  One need  only read Plyler v. Doe.48 In traditional
lawyers'  terms,  Justice  Brennan's  opinion,  holding  unconstitutional  a
Texas  statute  that denied a  free public  education  to  children  of aliens
unlawfully  in  this  country,  is  analytically  indefensible.4  It jams  to-
gether doctrines  that other cases  carefully held apart50  and refrains in a
footnote  from deciding  an issue that plays  a crucial  role in a later sec-
tion of the opinion.51  The opinion  cannot  be taken seriously  as a piece
of legal  analysis.  But  its  very  awkwardness  reveals  much  about  what
Justice  Brennan really  was doing:  not writing a carefully  crafted  opin-
ion,  not  being profound,  but building  a coalition.
Here is what  must have  gone  on  in Justice Brennan's  mind:52
I think  that  the  statute  embodies  a  dreadfully  unwise
44 Id.; see also infra note  46.
4'  See  Hutchinson,  Book Review,  81  MICH.  L. REv.  922,  924 (1983).
41 I shudder  at  imagining the  coalition in which Justice Rehnquist  is the  center.
47 I  have  been  persuaded  that,  despite  its  generally  high  level  of accuracy,  B.
WOODWARD  &  S. ARMSTRONG,  THE  BRETHREN  224-25  (1979),  errs in identifying  a
specific instance where  the authors contend that Brennan consciously made such a judg-
ment.  But the  psychological  picture  seems to  me entirely  correct.
48 457  U.S.  202 (1982).
49 See  Hutchinson, More Substantive Equal  Protection?  A Note on Plyler v. Doe,
1982  Sup.  CT. REv.  167.
"0  See  457 U.S.  at  223-24 (in determining appropriate  level  of scrutiny  to apply,
Court  must take  into account the importance of education  and  the severity  of effect  of
deprivation  on alien  children,  as  well  as  the  costs  to the  nation  likely to result).
51 Compare id. at  210 n.8  (Court need  not reach  question  whether Texas  statute
is preempted  by  federal law  and  policy)  with id. at 224-26  (the states'  power  to  deal
with  illegal  aliens  is limited  by Congress's  plenary power to  regulate  immigration).
'2  Safe in the  knowledge that it won't happen  in my lifetime, I will contribute  a
suitable amount  to the Society of American  Law Teachers, see supra note  1, if Justice
Brennan's papers  do not confirm  the proferred  reconstruction  of his thought  processes.
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social policy. Justice Marshall certainly  agrees with me. Fif-
teen years ago we  might have said so openly,  held the statute
unconstitutional,  and  have  been  done  with  it.  But  things
have changed,  and I have to get three more votes. How can I
do  that?
Well,  one  thing  about  this  case  is that it  involves  kids
who are being deprived  of something largely  because of what
their  parents  have  done.  In  that  way  it  is  sort  of  like  the
various illegitimacy cases  we have decided.53 I know that the
analogy  isn't  exact,  and  our  decisions  in  those  cases  are  to
say  the least not  readily  reconciled."  But  one  thing is  clear
from  the cases.  Justice  Blackmun thinks  that it's not  a  nice
thing to penalize kids for their parents'  actions; indeed it's so
"not  nice"  as  to  be  quite  often  unconstitutional.55  So  if  I
stick in some stuff about the analogy  to illegitimacy, maybe I
can  get Justice  Blackmun to  go  along.5 8
Who next? Justice Powell knows,  from Virginia's expe-
rience  during  the  period  of massive  resistance  to  desegrega-
tion,  the  severity  of the  social  costs  of  wholesale  denials  of
education.  Indeed,  he  said  something  along  those  lines  in
San Antonio Independent School  District No.  1 v.  Rodri-
quez.5 7  So  what  I should  do  is  stress that this  case  involves
absolute  deprivations  of  education,"  and  maybe  Justice
Powell  will go along. Of course, by throwing in the analogy
to illegitimacy cases and emphasizing  the importance of edu-
cation,  I may make it look  like we  are abandoning the rigid
two-tier approach  to  equal  protection  law  to  which  Justice
53  See, e.g.,  Glona v. American  Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co.,  391 U.S.  73 (1968);  Levy
v.  Louisiana,  391  U.S.  68  (1968).
"  Compare Levy v.  Louisiana,  391  U.S.  68  (1968)  (state law  preventing illegiti-
mate children from recovering  for the wrongful  death of their mothers  held unconstitu-
tional)  with  Labine  v.  Vincent,  401  U.S.  532  (1971)  (upholding  bar  to  illegitimates
taking  under  state  intestate  succession  law).
55  See,  e.g.,  Matthews  v. Lucas, 427  U.S. 495,  505  (1976)  (Blackmun, J., for  the
Court) (conceding  that strict  scrutiny  is not applicable to laws  classifying  on  the basis
of legitimacy  but writing that the Court has  "had  no difficulty  in finding the  discrimi-
nation  impermissible  on  less  demanding  standards"  when  laws  penalize  illegitimate
children solely because  of their  illegitimacy); Weber  v. Aetna Casualty  & Sur. Co., 406
U.S.  164, 176 (1972)  (Blackmun, J., concurring in the result) (stating that a  Louisiana
statute  denying  a  father  the  ability  to  acknowledge  his  illegitimate  children  without
marrying their  mother and thus barring the children  from  receiving survivorship  bene-
fits  as  acknowledged  dependents  of their  father denies  equal protection  to  the illegiti-
mate children).
56  See Plyler, 457  U.S.  at  220.
57  411  U.S.  1, 23-25,  29-30  (1973).
58  See 457  U.S.  at  221-22.
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Powell is committed.  So I guess  I ought to  stick in some lan-
guage expressly  reaffirming  our adherence  to the Rodriquez
approach.59 Justice  Marshall's  not  going  to  like  that,"'  but
he  certainly  will  go  no  farther  than  writing  a  concurring
opinion.
Who's left? Justice Stevens  has this bizarre attraction to
the  idea  that  equal  protection  cases  involving  state  regula-
tions  affecting  aliens  are rather  like  preemption  cases.6"  No
one  else  will  go  along  with  a  pure  preemption  analysis,
probably  correctly, but I can stress the primary responsibility
of the national  government  for regulating  aliens and  for cre-
ating the problem Texas was dealing with  in the first place.
Having done that, I can try a sort  of reverse preemption  ar-
gument,  that  the statute  is  unconstitutional  kind of because
Congress  didn't  authorize  it.62  That's  five.  What  a  weird
opinion  this  is  going to turn  out  to be.
And  so  it  is.63
Precedents,  politics, and personality thus have  influenced the Bur-
ger  Court's  failed  counterrevolution.  But  something  surely  has
happened.
III.  WHAT  ACTUALLY  HAPPENED
The  Burger  Court  differs  from  the  Warren  Court  along  dimen-
sions that I label technical,  cultural, and political. Although some of the
differences  are only matters  of degree, taken  together they have  signifi-
cant  consequences.
Along  the technical  dimension,  the most striking  difference  is the
"  See id. at 221,  223; see also id. at 239  n.3  (Powell, J., concurring);  id. at 232-
33  (Blackmun,  J., concurring).
0'  See id. at 230-31  (Marshall, J.,  concurring).
61  See, e.g.,  Hampton v.  Mow  Sun Wong,  426  U.S.  88,  100-01  (1976)  (Stevens,
J., for the Court)  (dictum)  ("We  agree  with  the petitioners'  position that  overriding
national interests  may provide  a justification  for  a  citizenship  requirement in the  fed-
eral  service  even  though  an  identical  requirement  may  not be  enforced  by  a  State."
(footnote  omitted));  Mathews  v.  Diaz,  426  U.S.  67,  84  (1976)  (Stevens,  J., for  the
Court)  (dictum)  ("[Ilt is the  business of the  political  branches of the Federal  Govern-
ment,  rather than that of ...  the  States ...  ,to  regulate  the conditions  of entry and
residence  of aliens.").
62  See id. at 218-19  & nn.17-18, 225-26.
63  For a case in  which Justice Brennan  wroie  a concurring  opinion  emphasizing
the limits  to the  holding  of the  opinion of the  Court-limits he  seems likely  to  have
assisted  in  inserting-see  Rhodes  v.  Chapman,  452  U.S.  337  (1981).  For  a  case  in
which  it  seems  likely that Justice  Brennan  narrowed  the holding and  then joined  the
dissent,  see Hensley  v.  Eckerhart,  103  S.  Ct.  1933  (1983).
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one  to  which  Thomas  Emerson  alludes  in  referring  to  the  Burger
Court's  insensitivity  to  the  systemic operations  of institutions  regulated
by law. 4  Emerson specifically mentions the Burger Court's "return[]  to
a balancing test"  in first amendment cases.65 There is no necessary con-
nection  between  relying  on balancing  and  making  relatively  conserva-
tive  decisions,  nor between adopting  bright-line rules and making rela-
tively  liberal  ones.  It  is  not  hard  to  imagine  a  speedy  trial  rule  that
barred relief to anyone who had failed to make a timely demand or that
started  the  speedy  trial  clock  running  at  the moment  a  demand  was
made. 6  The grimness of that alternative  undoubtedly  explains why the
Court's  decision  in Barker v.  Wingo 6 0 7  was  unanimous  in  adopting  a
balancing  test  in  which the  demand  and  its timing  were  relevant  but
never  dispositive  factors.6  That the stated  doctrine  requires  balancing
disposes  of  no  cases,  nor  does  such  a  doctrine  necessarily  incline  the
Court  one  way  or  the  other.  But  the  choice  between  balancing  and
bright-line  rules  may well  affect  how  actors  outside  the courts-police
officers,  or government  officials annoyed  by the press-approach  their
tasks.  In  the  absence  of  a bright-line  rule,  those  actors  may  be  more
inclined to test the ill-defined  limits of their authority.  They may hope
that  no litigation  will  result  because  of the ambiguity  of the rule69  or
that years later  some court will  decide that on balance they were right.
In  this  light  Kamisar's  distinction  between  the  two  Burger  Courts" 0
takes  on  a new  importance.  The  first Burger  Court, it might  be said,
accomplished  its  task  by  shifting  from  bright-line  rules  to  balancing
tests. That sent the message  to police  officers.  Of course, sometimes the
listeners  are  more  aggressive  than  the  broadcasters  expected,  which
Kamisar  suggests  is  the  explanation  for some  of the  decisions  by the
second Burger  Court.71  But taking activity that never comes  before the
'  Emerson, supra note  20,  at  26.
65  Id.  at  4.
'6 Cf. United States  v. MacDonald,  456  U.S.  1 (1982)  (the  speedy  trial  clause
does  not apply  to the  period  between  the dropping of military charges  and indictment
on civilian  charges).
67  407  U.S.  514  (1972)  (opinion of the Court  by Powell, J., joined by, inter  alia,
Douglas,  Brennan,  and  Marshall,  JJ.).
's Id. at 530-33; see also Oregon v.  Bradshaw,  103 S. Ct. 2830 (1983)  (statements
made after Miranda-ized suspect  initiated  discussion  to be judged  by test of knowing
and  intelligent  waiver  under  all  the  circumstances,  rather  than  being  automatically
admissible).
9 This  inclination  may  be  bolstered  by  Harlow  v. Fitzgerald,  457  U.S.  800
(1982)  (government  official  liable  for damages  caused by his or her violation  of consti-
tutional  rights only if official knew  or should have  known that action  was unconstitu-
tional  by  reference  to clearly  established  law).
70  See  supra text accompanying  notes  11-22.
'1 Kamisar, supra note  8,  at 81.
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courts into account, the systemic impact of the shift may be more signif-
icant than one  might  think after  reading  the Court's  opinions.
The cultural  dimension  of the Burger  Court's shift from the War-
ren Court is explored in a superb  essay  by  Robert  Burt on the Burger
Court  and  the  family. 2  By  carefully  exposing  the  often  unstated  as-
sumptions  that  animate  decisions,  Burt  establishes  that  the  Burger
Court  prefers  the  assertion  of  communal  authority,  either  through
traditional  authoritarian  families or by social agencies if the parents are
too  spineless,  over  the  autonomous  decisions  of families  considered  as
independent  social  units. 3  The most dramatic pair of cases  here is In-
graham v. Wright, 4  which denied parents a say in the administration
of  corporal  punishment  to  their  children  in  schools,  and Parham v.
J.R., 5  which allowed  parents  to  commit  their unruly  children  to  state
mental institutions without anyone  (else)  to speak for the children. Burt
contrasts  this  vision  with  the  Warren  Court's  image  of  reason  rather
than  authority  as  what  defines  why  and  how  the  state  may  regulate
families. 6 Burt is not happy with either vision,7 7  but that is less impor-
tant  here  than  the  connection  between  this  analysis  and  Shapiro's.
7 8
The Burger  Court's  family law  cases  show it defining  its constituency
as  adherents  of traditional  values,  in  contrast  to  the  Warren* Court's
constituency  of highly  educated  professionals.  The shift illustrates  one
of the cultural  changes  to  which  Shapiro's  essay  directs  our  attention.
On  the  borderland  between  culture  and  politics  lies  the  Burger
Court's  enthusiasm  for the imperial  presidency.  Here  we are  likely to
be misled  by  the  cases  directly connected  to Watergate,79  in which the
Court implicitly  acknowledged  that,  at least  with regard  to Watergate,
Richard  Nixon  was  indeed  a  crook. 8 0  Maybe  those  cases  should  have
been covered  in the criminal law chapter. After  the passions  of Water-
72  Burt, The Burger Court and the Family, in THE  BURGER  COURT, supra note
1, at  92.
73  Id. at  93.
74  430 U.S.  651  (1977)  (use of corporal  punishment in  schools  does  not infringe
student's due  process  rights so  long as it  is within limits of the common  law  privilege
permitting justifiable and  reasonable  correction).
75  442 U.S.  584 (1979).  The Court stated that the parents "retain  a substantial, if
not a  dominant  role in the  decision,  absent a  finding  of neglect  or abuse,"  but  added,
"the  child's  rights  and  the  nature  of the  commitment  decision  are  such  that  parents
cannot always  have  absolute and unreviewable  discretion  to decide  whether  to have a
child institutionalized."  Id. at  604.
78  Burt, supra note  72,  at  103-07.
7  Id. at  111.
78  See supra text accompanying  notes 26-39.
7, See,  e.g.,  Nixon v.  Administrator of Gen.  Servs.,  433 U.S.  425  (1977);  United
States  v.  Nixon,  418  U.S.  683  (1974).
"0  See generally B.  WOODWARD  & S. ARMSTRONG,  supra note  47,  at  285-349.
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gate waned and the Court faced a case not involving Watergate itself, it
was willing  to insulate the President  from liability  in damages  for  vio-
lating  the  Constitution."1  That  decision  fits  into  a  general  pattern  of
enhancing  the power of the President. 2 Moreover,  the Court held un-
constitutional  an  effort  by  Congress  to  establish  an  administrative
agency, the Federal  Election  Commission, over which it thought, sensi-
bly enough, it ought to  have more control than usual. 8 3  In cases  involv-
ing  prosecutions  of legislators, it has  endorsed a relatively  limited defi-
nition of the immunity provided by the speech and debate clause, 4  thus
making it easier  for prosecutors appointed  by the President to influence
the composition  of Congress. Dames & Moore v. Regan 85 approved  an
exercise  of presidential  authority indistinguishable in its  essentials from
that disapproved  in  the Steel Seizure Case." 8
Dames &  Moore shows  how  the considerations  of judicial politics
that Shapiro emphasizes  interact with substantive  concerns.  For, in ad-
dition  to  a rather  greater  enthusiasm  for the imperial presidency  these
days, Dames & Moore differs  from the Steel Seizure Case primarily  in
that the Court in 1981  could not possibly have gotten away with invali-
dating the  Iranian Hostage  Accords  while the  Court in  1952,  facing a
politically  weakened  President  who had-horror of horrors-trampled
on the prerogatives  of property,  could get away with what it did. 7  The
Court's  more  recent  invalidation  of  the  legislative  veto  in  INS  v.
Chadhas 8  is equally  illuminating.  The decision  is one  for which there
is,  so far as  I  can tell, no  defensible justification  in constitutional  the-
ory.  Jesse  Choper's  version  of the  popular  theory  authorizing judicial
81  Nixon  v.  Fitzgerald,  102  S.  Ct.  2690  (1982).
82  For a paragraph  on  the issue,  see Blasi, supra note  32,  at 202. In  addition  to
the cases there mentioned, see also Haig v. Agee, 453  U.S. 280 (1981);  Snepp  v. United
States,  444 U.S.  507  (1980).  The Snepp  case  is discussed  by Emerson  in  his  essay  on
freedom  of the  press.  See  Emerson, supra note  20,  at  12-14.
Buckley  v. Valeo,  424 U.S.  1 (1976).
'  See,  e.g.,  United States  v.  Brewster,  408  U.S.  501  (1972).
85  453  U.S.  654  (1981).
" Youngstown  Sheet & Tube  Co. v. Sawyer,  343 U.S.  579 (1952).  For a discus-
sion  of Dames & Moore,  see Symposium:  Dames  & Moore  v.  Regan,  29  UCLA  L.
REV.  977  (1981).  Although the President's  actions in  these cases were similar, the con-
texts  in  which they  acted possibly  are distinguishable.  In  the Steel Seizure Case Con-
gress had indicated  its intent that emergency  strikes  should not be  handled by seizure.
See  Labor  Management  Relations  Act  §§  201-210,  29 U.S.C.  §§  171-180  (1982).  In
Dames & Moore the  'Court found  implicit  congressional  support  for  the  President's
actions  in  the  International  Emergency  Economic  Powers  Act,  50  U.S.C.  §
1702(a)(1)(B)  (Supp. III  1979), and the Hostage Act,  22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1982).  In my
view,  however,  the nature  of  the  implicit  support  found  by  the  Court  in  Dames .&
Moore suggests  that the  Steel Seizure Case Court  could  have  found  equally  "persua-
sive"  authority  if it had  chosen  to  uphold  the President's  actions.
87  See generally M.  MARcus,  TRUMAN  AND  THE STEEL  SEIZURE  CASE  (1977).
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invalidation  of legislation  only where the political process  is unlikely to
take account of affected interests 9 demonstrates that there are no politi-
cal  obstacles  justifying  the  Court's  action  in  overturning  deals  that
Presidents  had  cut  with  Congress.96  Chief Justice  Burger's  opinion
hews to the interpretivist line and clinches  its argument by  underlining
the word  "and.""1  But Chadha accomplished  two things. First, the re-
sponse to  the decision  anticipated  the "no  counterrevolution"  thesis.  It
went roughly like this: "People  were afraid that the Burger Court lack-
ed  dedication  to  constitutional  principles.  The  legislative  veto  case
shows that they were wrong. Admittedly, we're not sure  why the  legis-
lative  veto  is  unconstitutional  even  after reading  the opinions,  but  by
God it  does  show that they  care  about 'The  Constitution.'"  And  sec-
ond, the decision  endorsed  a  theory of the  presidency  that stresses  the
prerogatives  and  powers  of  the office.92  Thus  the  Court  satisfied  two
constituencies:  those favoring an imperial  President and those espousing
a  "strict  construction"  perspective.
The  final,  purely  political  dimension  of what  has  happened  sub-
stantially  qualifies  Vincent Blasi's  argument  that the  Burger  Court  is
characterized  by  a  rootless  activism.  To  Blasi,  the  Burger  Court  has
been  driven  to  that  position  by  "the  reactive  nature  of judicial  re-
view." 93 It has been committed to respect for precedent and the cases it
confronts  have  been shaped  by  lower courts  not  as deeply  conservative
as  it is.94  Further, the  "rampant  growth  of  government  bureaucracy"
engendered  a  sense  among  the  citizenry  that  the government  was  too
complex  and  impersonal.95 It was natural  for the Court to  respond to
this  concern  by  adopting  simple  constitutional  solutions."'  Finally,  as
single  issue  politics  came  to  distort  the  legislative  process,  the  Court
responded,  offering  itself as an institution  that  could take an appropri-
ately  comprehensive  view of the problems.9"  According  to Blasi, the re-
sult has been a Court whose "activism  has been inspired  not by a com-
mitment  to  fundamental  constitutional  principles  or  noble  political
" See J.  ELY,  DEMOCRACY  AND  DisTRusT  101-04  (1980).
90  J.  CHOPER,  JUDICIAL  REVIEW  AND  THE  NATIONAL  POLITICAL  PROCESS  2
(1980).
91  Chadha, 103  S.  Ct. at 2781.
02  This is  not to say that the decision  enhances  the  President's  power. As Choper
shows,  Congress has many  resources of its own. See J.  CHOPER, supra note 90, at 281-
311.  Chadha forces the  deals between the executive and legislative branches to be rene-
gotiated  from  scratch,  but  it is not clear  that the substantive  outcomes  of the  negotia-
tions will change.
"  Blasi, supra note  32, at  208.
94  Id. at  208-09.
95  Id. at 209.
" Id.
9  Id. at  210.
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ideals, but rather by  the  belief that modest  injections of logic and com-
passion  by  disinterested,  sensible judges  can serve  as a  counterforce  to
some  of the  excesses  and  irrationalities  of contemporary  governmental
decision-making." ' 98 The Burger Court's activism is "centrist.  ..  [and]
essentially  pragmatic  in  nature,  lacking  a  central  theme  or  an
agenda."99
There  is  less  here  than  it first  seems,  and  the  essay  by  Norman
Dorsen and  Joel  Gora'00  identifies what  is missing.  Dorsen and  Gora
examine the  Burger  Court's  free  speech  decisions  and  conclude  that  a
"new  variable"-property-has  been  added  to  the mix  of values  pro-
tected  by the first amendment.1"'  Buckley v.  Valeo,' °2  in its free  speech
dimension,  and  the  commercial  speech  cases,  most  notably  Central
Hudson Gas &  Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,'0 3 make
this  explicit.'0 4
With this insight it is indeed  possible to find the roots of the Bur-
ger Court's  activism. They lie in the philosophy that the government  as
a whole has the duty to protect the prerogatives of property' 5 and that
no part of the government has the duty to minimize the harms that lack
of property inflicts  on those so  unfortunate as not to have enough. Rob-
ert Bennett's essay  on poverty  law'0 6 not surprisingly  presents  the most
unrelievedly  dark  view  of  the  Burger  Court.  The  best  he  can  do  to
lighten  the  gloom  is  to  include  Califano v.  Westcott,"' 0  in  which  the
Court held unconstitutional  a federal  law extending public assistance to
intact  families  when  the  father  was  unemployed  but  not  when  the
mother  was.'05  Califano v.  Westcott is,  however,  more  a  gender  case
than a  poverty  case.
But  the  poverty  cases  are not examples  of the Burger  Court's ac-
tivism  anyway.  More  revealing  are  the  free  speech  cases,0 9  Allied
98  Id. at 211.
99 Id.
100  Dorsen & Gora, The Burger Court and the Freedom of Speech, in THE BuR-
GER  COURT, supra note  1, at  28.
101  Id. at 31.
102  424 U.S.  1 (1976).
los  447  U.S.  557  (1980).
104  See  Dorsen  & Gora, supra note  100,  at 31-35.
105 Pruneyard  Shopping  Center  v. Robins,  447  U.S.  74  (1980),  holding  that  a
state  may  require owners  of shopping  centers to allow  distribution of political materi-
als,  is  arguably  to  the contrary.  Perhaps  all  it  involves  is  a definition  of the  central
prerogatives  of property.
1o0  Bennett, The Burger Court and the Poor, in THE BURGER  COURT, supra note
1, at 46.
107  443 U.S.  76  (1979).
108  Bennett, supra note  106,  at  52.
109  Central  Hudson  Gas  & Elec.  Corp. v.  Public  Serv.  Comm'n,  447  U.S.  557
(1980);  First Nat'l Bank  v. Bellotti,  435  U.S.  765  (1978).THE OPTIMIST'S  TALE
Structural Steel Co.  v. Spannaus," n  and  the  like  that underscore  the
Court's  preoccupation  with  protecting  property  values.  I  believe  that
the Court's sympathy to claims  of presidential authority'-  are cut from
the same pattern, in that such authority is seen  as essential  to guarantee
the  position  of the  United  States in  the  world  economic  and  political
system,  a system  that on the whole  functions  to  protect the position  of
the  privileged.
The gender  discrimination  cases  are obviously  more  problematic.
But  two  points  seem  worth  making.  First, many  of the relevant  deci-
sions hold  unconstitutional  the exclusion  of males  from  benefits  made
available to  women."U 2 As Ginsburg explains, these decisions  can read-
ily be rationalized as attacks on stereotypes of the proper female role.""
Those stereotypes  are closely  bound  up with images of household work
as unproductive  in contrast  to  "productive"  work  "outside"  the house-
hold.  They  are  therefore  closely  bound  up  with  issues  of  class  as
well." 4  The  Court's  willingness  to  question  gender-role  stereotypes
will  have  a  limited impact  so long  as it  fails  to  question  class  stereo-
types too. Yet that is precisely the limit of its activism. Second,  because
of the present contours of political power in the United States, middle-
class  women  have been the primary direct  beneficiaries  of the women's
movement.  That is not to say that working-class  women  have not bene-
fited, nor is  it to  assert that women's  activists  have  been satisfied  with
advances  limited  in that class-based  way.  But that fact of political  life
makes  it easier to understand why the Burger Court's activitism in gen-
der cases  is at least not inconsistent with its concern  for the prerogatives
It0  438  U.S.  234 (1978)  (contracts clause of the  Constitution prohibits states from
substantially  impairing a contractual  relationship,  such  as the  pension  provisions of an
employment  contract,  absent  a  purpose  of resolving  a  broad, generalized  economic  or
social  problem).
"I"  See supra note  82; see also Dames  & Moore  v. Regan,  453  U.S.  654  (1981).
112 See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S.  268  (1979)  (Alabama's statutory scheme impos-
ing  alimony  obligations  on  husbands  but  not  on  wives  violates  the  equal  protection
clause).  Where  the  benefits are an  essential  part  of the  income that  flows  to a  family
unit over the  lifetime of its members,  as are  Social Security  benefits, one  cannot unam-
biguously  define the  gender bearing  the  burden. For example,  in  Weinberger  v. Wie-
senfeld,  420 U.S.  636  (1975),  the  Court held  unconstitutional  a statute that provided a
benefit to female caretakers of a deceased wage earner's child but none to male caretak-
ers.  From one  view, this decision  increased  the income  of fathers  after their wives died.
From another,  it increased  the value of the fringe  benefits  included  in wives'  incomes
during  their  lifetimes.
113 Ginsburg, supra note  3,  at  137-40.
114  The "inside/outside  the  home"  dichotomy  rests  on  the  image  of a world  of
work,  governed  by  class  relations,  contrasted  to  a world  of  domesticity,  governed  by
gender relations. For an  examination  of the instability  of this dichotomy's applications
to legal  topics, see Olsen,  The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform,  96  HARV.  L.  REV.  1497  (1983).
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of  property.  And,  of  course,  in  its  most  direct  confrontation  with  a
problem in which women's issues and class issues intersected, the Court
in Harris  v. McRae' 15 forthrightly  held that governments  had no duty
to  make  abortions  available  to  those  who  could  not  otherwise  afford
them.
CONCLUSION
The  Burger  Court's  interest  in  the  prerogatives  of property  sug-
gests that its  activism is  more rooted than Blasi indicates.  But does that
impair  the  "no  counterrevolution"  thesis?  According  to  Blasi's  assess-
ment  of the Warren  Court, it  does.  He  writes,  "[T]he  Warren  Court
was  fired  by a  vision  of  the  equal  dignity  of  man,"  and  though  "on
many  occasions"  it  "exhibited  a  pragmatic,  compromising  side,"  the
compromises  "took  place  against  a  background  in  which  the  direction
of  constitutional  development  was  both  clear  and,  to  many,  inspir-
ing." 6 The Burger Court is also pragmatic, but it has "no deep-seated
vision.1 n7  Contrary  to  Blasi,  I  believe  that it  does  have  a  vision, one
that, moreover,  is  also  inspiring "to  many."
But notice  the  difference  between  Blasi's  and  Kamisar's  contrasts
between the Warren and Burger Courts. I believe  that Kamisar is more
accurate.  Here  I  revert  to  Shapiro's  argument  that the Warren  Court
constitutionalized  the  policies  of the  New  Deal.  I  have  no  doubt  that
the New  Deal  program was,  for its  time and given  the limits on effec-
tive transformative  action  in  the United  States,  a  major  achievement,
providing  an  important  foundation-or  "safety  net"-which  has  re-
cently been undermined  (or unravelled).  But that program was no less
pragmatic and compromising  than any other political  program. It is no
more a  moral vision  when  adopted  by the  Supreme Court than  it was
when Congress adopted  it. Or, to put it another  way, what Blasi views
as occasional  compromises with a moral  vision should rather be seen as
integral  parts that  serve  to  define  precisely  what  that vision  was.
Indeed it may  be that the ultimate judgment  on the Warren Court
is that "many"  were  able to  read  into its decisions  a moral vision that
was not there. All  the Burger  Court has done, on this interpretation, is
to disabuse-or, in light of Blasi's position, provide  us with the oppor-
tunity to disabuse-those  readers of the illusion that the Warren  Court
was a place where the party of humanity implemented  its political pro-
15  448 U.S.  297  (1980).
116  Blasi, supra note  32,  at 212.
11  Id.; see also id. at 216  (Burger Court  has "powerful  aversion  to making  fun-
damental  value  choices";  Warren Court "had  a moral  vision  and  an  agenda").
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gram.  It turns  out  that  there  was in fact no  counterrevolution  because
there  had been  no  revolution  in the  first place.11
11  This,  I  take  it,  is  one  reading  of the  thesis  of A.  BICKEL,  THE  SUPREME
COURT  AND  THE  IDEA  OF  PROGRESS  (1978).
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United  States  Court of Appeals  for the Third  Circuit.